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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
LOUIS LEE MACIAL, : Case No. 920316-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Louis Lee Macial relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant 
replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State has acknowledged that its explanation for the use 
of a peremptory challenge did not demonstrate a particular bias of 
Ms. English, the female black juror. Since a showing of bias must 
be part of the prosecutor's explanation as it "relate[s] to the case 
being tried," the cited justification was legally insufficient. 
Regardless of whether Ms. English was characterized as 
"whiny" or "unwilling to speak [about her discrimination lawsuit]," 
both explanations failed to satisfy the requirements of applicable 
case law. The prosecution's speculative concern that Ms. English 
"would [not] be a good juror with the other jurors" could have been 
cleared up with a simple inquiry, questions not asked by the State. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE A LEGALLY ADEQUATE 
EXPLANATION FOR ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
(Reply to Appellee's Brief) 
Mr. Macial and the State both agree that the four criteria 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 
(Utah 1989) ("Cantu II,f), provides a useful framework for analyzing 
the adequacy of the prosecutor's rebuttal explanation of a 
peremptory challenge. Opening Brief of Appellant Macial, page 10; 
Appellee's Brief, page 9. "[A]n explanation given by a prosecutor 
for the exercise of a peremptory challenge must be (1) neutral, 
(2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably 
specific, and (4) legitimate.'11 Cantu II
 r 778 P. 2d at 518 (quoting 
State v, Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987)). However, as 
recognized by the Cantu II opinion, the list is not exhaustive and 
may include other circumstances. See Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-19 
(citing People v. Wheeler. 583 P.2d 748, 764 (1978) and State v. 
Slappv. 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988)). 
Contrary to the State's contention, see Appellee's brief 
at 12, other relevant factors include (1) the failure to demonstrate 
a juror's specific bias, and (2) the fact that similarly situated 
jurors were treated differently. Opening Brief of Appellant Macial, 
Points B & C.l; cf. Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 519 (construing People v. 
Hall. 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74, 672 P.2d 854, 857 (1983) 
(peremptories must be based on grounds reasonably related to case on 
- 2 -
trial or for reasons of specific bias)).1 
Because the State has conceded that M[t]he prosecution did 
not demonstrate that Ms. English had a particular bias[,] . . ." see 
Appellee's brief at 12, the prosecutor's explanation must fail. The 
trial court clearly erred2 in accepting the State's "justification" 
that because the black juror, Ms. English, was "[unwilling] to speak 
before the rest of the group about a matter [the discrimination 
lawsuit] that I [the prosecutor] didn't find . . . was so 
personal, . . . I [did not] think she would be a good juror with the 
other jurors." (R 216). 
the trial judge must be careful not to confuse a 
specific reason given fey the state's attorney for his 
challenge, with a "specific bias" of the iuror. which 
may justify the peremptory challenge: 
"The latter, a permissible basis for exclusion of a 
prospective juror, was defined in Wheeler as "a 
bias relating to the particular case on trial or 
the parties or witnesses thereto." Wheeler, 22 
Cal.3d at 276, 148 Cal. Rptr., at 902, 583 P.2d 
at 760. 
Floyd v. State. 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (emphasis 
1 See also State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 1988) 
(Cantu I) ("we will examine the record to determine if all the 
' facts and circumstances' raise the inference that the prosecution 
used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory 
manner"); Slappv, 522 So.2d at 22 (asserted reasons weighed in light 
of the total course of the voir dire). 
2 Appellant continues to maintain that the appropriate 
standard of review is a bifurcated approach, with deference given to 
the trial court's subsidiary findings and a correction of error 
standard accorded its ultimate legal conclusion. See Opening Brief 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
- 3 -
added). As alluded to by the above authorities, not only is 
"specific bias" an appropriate consideration, such a showing is 
actually subsumed by definition within the "related to the case 
being tried" criterion of Cantu II. See Floyd, 539 So.2d at 361; 
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (second requirement); see also 778 P.2d 
at 519 (emphasis added) ("The [prosecutor's] question was both 
desultory and insufficient to establish any specific bias on the 
part of the jurors"). 
Interestingly, the State on appeal has discounted the 
prosecutor's "whiny" explanation, the justification immediately 
preceding its "bottom line" rationale: "I [the prosecutor] don't 
think she would be a good juror with the other jurors." (R 216). 
But see Salt Lake Citv v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 
1977) (under the "last antecedent" rule of construction, "qualifying 
words and phrases are generally regarded as applying to the 
immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote ones"). 
Instead, the State has emphasized Ms. English's alleged 
2 -[footnote cont'd]-
of Appellant Macial, pages 2-3; State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). Mr. Macial disputes on appeal, as he did at 
trial, the court's assessment of Ms. English's demeanor. 
(R 216-17). He realizes, however, that the court's finding on this 
is entitled to deference. Nevertheless, under either the "clearly 
erroneous" or the "question of law" standard, the court's ultimate 
ruling was in error. See, e.g., State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 
(Utah 1989) (the trial court may have found that the prosecution 
exercised its peremptory challenge because it was angry at defense 
counsel, but the court improperly concluded that such a reason 
constituted a valid, legal basis); Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (although the trial court's factual findings 
were not disputed, the legal conclusions premised upon those 
findings were "clearly erroneous"); Hill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 74 
(Tex. App. 1990). 
4 -
"unwillingness to speak up before the other jurors, which was 
evident in both her reluctance to openly state that she had 
attempted to sue the Board of Education for job discrimination and 
her question about whether she should vocally tell what her daughter 
did for the FBI." Appellee's brief at 10 (citations omitted). 
For reasons similar to the whininess contention (which has 
already been discussed and does not require repetition, see Opening 
Brief of Appellant Macial, pages 10-19), the "unwillingness" 
argument also failed to satisfy the four considerations of 
Cantu II. See 778 P.2d at 518. 
In addition, the FBI related argument is inadequate. 
First, the prosecutor below made no reference to the FBI when asked 
by the trial court to explain its peremptory. (R 216). 
Consequently, such a contention was not specifically preserved and 
cannot now be raised by the State on appeal. People v. Turner, 726 
P.2d 102, 108 n.7 (Cal. 1986) ("our concern is with the explanation 
the prosecutor gave to the trial court, not with a theory 
subsequently devised by the Attorney General for consumption on 
appeal"); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). 
Secondly, almost immediately before the FBI response, 
another juror told the court about a relative in the CIA. (R 163) 
("I [Mr. Harris] have an uncle that worked in the CIA and I have a 
cousin that is chief of police in Roosevelt"). Although informed 
about the CIA, the court said only, "All right. Anyone else?" 
(R 163). Just a few moments (one other juror) later, however, 
(R 163), when Ms. English told the court that tf[m]y daughter works 
- 5 -
concerns. £f. Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518 (quoting Slappv, 522 So.2d 
at 22 (a factor casting doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly 
race-neutral explanation includes the "failure to examine the juror 
or perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor 
opposing counsel had questioned the juror")). 
4 -[footnote cont'd]-
your hand and say, "Stop, I might have missed this, 
it's important"? 
MS. LEWIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Nobody is going to hold that against you. 
I would rather — everybody would rather have you hear 
everything and make sure that you're there. 
MS. LEWIS: Okay. Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. LEWIS: It makes me feel better that you guys let 
me know that, that I can — I'm just — like I said, a 
little bit shy and it's hard for me to speak up. But 
I could raise my hand. 
(R 177). 
Ms. Lewis expressly admitted that "it's hard for me to 
speak up." (R 177). For Ms. English, however, the prosecutor 
simply assumed that because she was "[unwilling] to speak before the 
rest of the group about [her lawsuit] . . . she would [not] be a 
good juror with the other jurors." (R 216); Appellee's brief at 11. 
In fairness to the State, Ms. Lewis' shyness may not have 
been evident because the above inquiry had focused initially on her 
hearing difficulties. However, once Ms. Lewis' reluctance to speak 
was revealed, as opposed to the assumed "unwillingness" of 
Ms. English, the prosecution displayed its ability to ask a follow-up 
question (albeit redundant). In fact, the verifying remarks proved 
comforting to Ms. Lewis. (R 177). Nothing was said to make 
Ms. English "feel better." Ms. English's capacity to deliberate 
with the other jurors was summarily discounted and presumed because 
of her demeanor. (R 216). Further, the court's defense of 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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Finally, the State's preservation argument is inapplicable 
here. Since the trial court requested an explanation for the 
peremptory, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to "come forward 
with a racially neutral reason related to the particular case to be 
tried to explain the challenge." Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595; Wheeler. 
583 P.2d at 765; Slappv. 522 So.2d at 22; Williams v. State. 548 
So.2d 501, 504 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (citation omitted) ("Where the 
trial court requires the prosecution to explain its peremptory 
challenges without first finding the existence of a prima facie 
showing of discrimination, we may fairly conclude that 'the enquiry 
implied such a finding, and shifted the burden of justification to 
the prosecutor'"); Opening Brief of Appellant Macial, page 9. 
The prosecution bears the burden of specifically 
articulating its justification; the credibility of the reason is 
then "weighed in light of the circumstances of the case and the 
total course of the voir dire in question, as reflected in the 
record." Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22; State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 
778 (Utah App. 1991) ("it remained proper for the court to consider 
all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the State's 
4 -[footnote cont'd]-
Ms. Lewis, who relied in part on reading lips, (R 175), should have 
been extended to Ms. English, who had no physical impediments 
interfering with her ability to understand the proceedings. See 
(R 191a-192) (the trial court: "people with disabilities ought to do 
things that the rest of the people do that don't have disabilities 
to the extent they can and, obviously, we're very, very concerned in 
any jury case, particularly a criminal case, as to whether or not 
those disabilities interfere with that person acting as a juror"). 
- 9 -
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Ms. Mary Noonan 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. Macial 
Case No. 920316-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant/Appellant Louis Lee Macial cites the following 
supplemental authority, State v. Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(Utah App. 1993), for the criteria pertinent to judging a peremptory 
challenge: 
the party exercising the challenge must explain, in a 
clear, reasonably specific manner, legitimate, neutral 
reasons for his or her challenges that are related to 
the specific case about to be tried. 
Utah has adopted additional criteria by which to 
judge the adequacy of a party's explanation of an 
allegedly racially motivated peremptory challenge. 
The trial court must discount justifications if the 
prospective juror was (1) not shown to share an 
alleged bias, (2) not examined or subjected only to 
perfunctory examination by the prosecutor when neither 
the trial court nor the defense had questioned him or 
her, (3) singled out for questioning to evoke a 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
February 5, 1993 
Page Two 
specific response, (4) challenged for a reason 
unrelated to the trial, or (5) challenged for reasons 
equally applicable to other jurors not similarly 
challenged. 
Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44 (emphasis added by the court and 
citations omitted). 
Respectfully, 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorney for Appellant Macial 
n 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused an 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies to CHARLENE BARLOW of the 
Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this **ffy day of February, 1993. X 
{*»•£. 
RONALD S. TUJINO 
DELIVERED by Wft PpAM 5(^ 1 
this S day of February, 1993, 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
Established in 1965 
F. JOHN HILL 
Director 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Chairman 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
SOLOMON CHACON 
LIONEL H. FRANKEL 
JOSEPH A. GETER 
RAY GROUSSMAN 
LON HINDE 
J. RAND HIRSCHI 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
GRANT H. PALMER 
February 18 , 19 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 1 8 1993 
y . Mary T. Noonan 
^T3 CSerkcrfthe Court 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. Macial 
Case No. 920316-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and in response to the Court's comments made during oral 
argument, Defendant/Appellant Louis Lee Macial states: 
1. "The burden of proof shift[s] to the prosecutor to 
provide race-neutral justifications for his actions." 
State v. Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah App. 
1993); see also id. at 42 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 92) (emphasis added) ("the [United States Supreme] 
Court intended that its new analytical framework, 
should remove a crippling burden of proof from the 
defendant"). 
2. The Pharris opinion's list of criteria is 
controlling for the case at bar. Pharris, 204 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 44 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79 (1986), and State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1989)) . 
3. "Stare decisis has an equal application when one 
panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
February 18, 1993 
Page Two 
prior decision of a different panel [i.e. the Pharris 
panel]." State v. Thumtan, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 25 
(Utah 1993) (panel conflicts should be avoided). 
Respectfully, 
7^£ ^ n 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorney for Appellant Macial 
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